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Default rules express concise pieces of knowledge having implicit exceptions, which is appropriate for reasoning under
incomplete information. Speciﬁc rules that explicitly refer to exceptions of more general default rules can then be handled
in a non-monotonic setting. However, there is no assessment of the certainty with which the conclusion of a default rule
holds when it applies. We propose a formalism in which uncertain default rules can be expressed, but still preserving the
distinction between the defeasibility and uncertainty semantics by means of a two steps processing. Possibility theory is
used for representing both uncertainty and defeasibility. The approach is illustrated in persistence modeling problems.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Reasoning under incomplete information by means of rules having exceptions, and reasoning under uncer-
tainty are two important types of reasoning that artiﬁcial intelligence has studied at length and formalized in
diﬀerent ways in order to design inference systems able to draw conclusions from available information as it is.
However, the joint handling of exceptions and uncertainty has received little attention in non-monotonic rea-
soning, up to few noticeable exceptions [1–3]. This is the topic of this paper.
Default rules are useful in order to express general behaviors concisely, without referring to exceptional
cases. Moreover, they only require general information to be ﬁred, which agrees with situations of incomplete
information. In practice, reasoning from a set of exception-tolerant default rules in presence of incomplete
knowledge ﬁrst amounts to select default rules. The selected set of rules should focus on the current context
describing the particular incomplete information situation that is considered, and then this set of rules can be
applied to this information situation in order to draw plausible conclusions. When new information is avail-
able on the current situation, these conclusions may be revised at the light of more appropriate default rules.
The selection problem is solved in practice by rank-ordering the default rules in such a way that the most
speciﬁc rules whose conclusion may conﬂict with the conclusion of more general defaults, receive a higher level0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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depends on the whole set of default rules that are considered.
However, conclusions that we want to privilege in a given context may themselves be pervaded with uncer-
tainty. Indeed, when a rule of the form ‘‘if a then b generally’’ is stated, no estimate of the certainty of having b
true in context a is provided, even roughly. The status of being a default rule, is just a proviso for possible excep-
tional situations to which other rules in the knowledge base may refer. The priority level of a default rule in a set
of such rules cannot be regarded as a kind of qualitative certainty level. In fact, it may happen that a speciﬁc rule
provides default conclusions that are less certain than more general rules, or on the contrary strengthens the
certainty of its conclusion. For instance, the rule ‘‘birds with large wings ﬂy’’ is more certain than ‘‘birds
ﬂy’’, while one may consider that the rule ‘‘Antarctic birds ﬂy’’ is less certain than ‘‘birds ﬂy’’, assuming that
in Antarctic there are many penguins (that do not ﬂy) together with some more sea birds that ﬂy. But, even
if it is less certain, the speciﬁc rule that ﬁts the particular context of incomplete information at hand, is the right
one to use. More generally, the uncertainty attached to a rule is not necessarily related to its speciﬁcity level.
As already said, reasoning with default rules and under uncertainty are two important research trends that
have been developed quite independently from each other in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, even if conditional prob-
abilities do exhibit a kind1 of non-monotonic behavior when its context part is modiﬁed. They indeed address
two distinct problems, in general using symbolic and numerical approaches, respectively. Default rules are
concise pieces of knowledge (by omitting some propositional variables that are needed for describing excep-
tional situations), which are especially useful in case of incomplete information. Reasoning with non-defeasi-
ble rules requires the complete speciﬁcation of all relevant variables. It is still the case when reasoning under
uncertainty. However, handling uncertainty, at least qualitatively, in a given incomplete information context is
crucial in various situations. For example, high level descriptions of dynamical systems often requires both the
use of default rules that express persistence (for the sake of concise representation) and the processing of
uncertainty due to the limitation of the available information.
This paper proposes a joint handling of defaults and uncertainty in qualitative possibility theory, where
there already exist separate treatments for them (although other uncertainty representation settings could
be considered). Separate refreshers on the possibilistic handling of uncertainty and defaults are given in
Appendix A and B while the problem raised by their joint processing is ﬁrst discussed. Then three methods
for default reasoning are presented before integrating uncertainty in these methods. The approach is illus-
trated on the problem of persistence handling in dynamical environments (persistence rules are by nature
default rules), and links with related works are discussed. Another illustration about reasoning with fuzzy
defaults such as ‘‘young birds cannot ﬂy’’ understood as ‘‘the younger the bird, the more certain it cannot
ﬂy’’ can be found in a previous version of this paper [8]. This paper is a revised and slightly expanded version
of the main parts of two conference papers [9,8].
2. Uncertain default rules
We assume a representation languageL built on a set of propositional variablesV. The set of interpreta-
tions associated with this language is denoted by X. An interpretation x 2 X represents a state of the system
under study. In order to have a more expressive representation formalism, we now introduce the notion of
uncertain default rule.
Deﬁnition 1. An uncertain default rule is a pair (a[ b, a) where a and b are propositional formulas ofL, and
a is the certainty level of the rule, the symbol [ is a non-classical connective encoding a non-monotonic
consequence relation between a and b.
In the following, for simplicity, we use for certainty levels the real interval scale [0,1]. However a qualitative
scale could be used, since only the complete preorder between the levels is meaningful. The intuitive meaning
of (a[ b, a) is ‘‘by default, if a is true then b has a certainty level at least equal to a’’. For instance, let b, f, w1 Indeed translating the default ‘‘if a then b generally’’ by a constraint of the form Prob(bja)P a violates System P postulates of non-
monotonic reasoning [6,7].
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a default rule since it admits exceptions mentioned in other rules: for instance, (b ^ w[ f, a2) (‘‘wounded
birds generally do not ﬂy’’). But it is also an uncertain rule since when all we know is that we are in presence
of a bird, the certainty level a1 is attached to the provisional conclusion that it ﬂies. Thus, the a’s provide an
additional information with respect to the default rule. Moreover, the more speciﬁc rule about wounded birds
is again an uncertain default rule since some ones may ﬂy. Note that, in general, as suggested by the
above example where there is no clear inequality constraint between a1 and a2, there is no relation between
the certainty level associated with a default rule and the certainty level associated with a more speciﬁc rule.
In particular, it would be wrong to assume that the more speciﬁc rule always provides a more certain
conclusion.
The core of our treatment of uncertain default rules is based on the idea of translating them into a set of
uncertain (non-defeasible) rules. This can be done in diﬀerent ways, depending on how default rules are han-
dled and on the kind of uncertainty representation framework. In the following, uncertainty is modeled in the
qualitative setting of possibility theory [10,11] and possibilistic logic (see Appendix A). Indeed, this agrees with
the qualitative nature of default rules. We present several approaches for dealing with default rules.
Roughly speaking, default reasoning amounts to apply a set of default rules D to a factual propositional
base FC describing a context at hand.
• A ﬁrst idea is then to select the subset of the rules of D that is appropriate for the factual context FC under
consideration and remove the other rules, and to turn the selected rules into classical propositional rules. As
we shall see, this idea is not entirely satisfactory, because many information are lost (due to a drowning
eﬀect that leads to a problem of inheritance blocking).
• A method that copes with this diﬃculty, still relying on the context, named contextual entailment, has been
proposed in [12]. This method may be too cautious and has no known eﬃcient algorithmic counterpart.
Based on this idea, we propose a contextual rational entailment that is less cautious than the previous
one. The problem is that the context should be given before each deduction, so for each change of context
a compilation of the default base must be done.
• Another approach that we also explore further in the following, and for which we provide an eﬃcient algo-
rithm, is to rewrite each default rule into a propositional rule by making its condition part more precise (by
explicitly naming the exceptions mentioned in the default base). This approach is more satisfactory with
respect to the problems encountered by the previous methods. However, to be able to deal with incomplete
information, this set of rewritten rules should be augmented with an additional set of rules that depends on
the context and states in what respect this context is not exceptional. These additional rules aim at complet-
ing the factual context in order to be able to apply the rewritten rules.
In the following section, we discuss in detail the three above alternatives for handling default rules before
presenting the treatment of uncertain default rules in a new section.
3. Handling default rules
A normative approach to default reasoning is provided by System P [13] that deﬁnes a ‘‘preferential’’ infer-
ence between formulas, denoted , relation obeying one axiom and ﬁve inference postulates:
Reﬂexivity: a a,
Left logical equivalence: if ‘ aM b and a c then b c,
Right weakening: if a ‘ b and c a then c b,
Cut: if a ^ b c and a b then a c,
Cautious monotony: if a b and a c then a ^ b c,
Or: if a c and b c then a _ b c,
where a b reads ‘‘b follows non-monotonically from a’’ (in this paper, we indiﬀerently replace a by a set of
formulas viewed as equivalent to their conjunction). The set of conclusions that one can obtain by using a
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tonic consequence relation for default reasoning should generate. Lehmann and Magidor [14] have deﬁned a
more adventurous consequence relation (which allows to draw more conclusions), named ‘‘rational closure
entailment’’, which is a ‘‘preferential’’ relation that also obeys a Rational Monotony rule:
Rational monotony: if a b and a c then a ^ c b.
Another landmark work in the treatment of default rules is the system Z [4] for stratifying a set of default
rules according to their speciﬁcity (see Appendix B). Given a set of default rules D, System Z stratiﬁcation
partitions it into subsets D0, . . . , Dn, where rules in Di have priority over the ones in Dj if i > j. These priorities
reﬂect speciﬁcity levels since speciﬁc rules get higher priority. System Z is a rational closure entailment. Besides
rational closure entailment and System Z entailment have been shown to be equivalent to a possibilistic treat-
ment of default rules brieﬂy recalled in Appendix B [15].
In the following, we consider a set D of default rules, together with a propositional factual base FC describ-
ing all the available information about the context. Three methods for drawing plausible conclusions from FC
using D are presented below. The factual base FC is supposed to be consistent. Moreover, we also assume that
the set D is consistent. This means that we cannot encounter a situation where it is not possible to compute
the speciﬁcity levels of D. This consistency condition is equivalent to the existence of a possibility measure
P satisfying the set of constraints P(a ^ b) > P(a ^ b) associated with each default in the base D, leading
to a possibilistic logic handling of the speciﬁcity levels (see Appendix B and A). This is the basis of the ﬁrst
method.3.1. Method 1: possibilistic selection of the rules in a given context
Given a set D of default rules and a factual base FC, the possibilistic approach proceeds in two main steps:
• Associate to each default rule r = a[ b 2 D its speciﬁcity level dðrÞ ¼ ZðrÞþ1nþ2 , where Z(r) is the rank of the
stratum of r once the system Z procedure has been applied (see Appendix B). Let Dp be the possibilistic
knowledge base s.t. Dp = {(ai! bi, d(ai[ bi))jai[ bi 2 D} where ! is the classical material implication.
Besides, each proposition u in FC is encoded in a possibilistic format: (u, 1), which amounts to consider
the factual information as totally certain. Then compute the inconsistency level Inc(Dp [ FC) (see Appen-
dix A).
• Applying default rules in D to FC amounts to reason with the formulas in Dp [ FC that are above
Inc(Dp [ FC). Hence, remove each formula (ai ! bi, ri) from Dp such that ri 6 Inc(Dp [ FC).Deﬁnition 2 (Rational closure entailment). A formula w is said to be a rational closure consequence of D given
a factual context FC, denoted by FC R,Dw, if and only if w is a classical consequence of FC [ D, where
D = {ai! bijai[ bi 2 D and d(ai[ bi) > Inc(Dp [ FC)}:FC
R;D
w iff FC [ D ‘ w:Example 1. We consider the following default base, describing the fact that birds generally ﬂy and wounded
birds generally do not ﬂy: u1:b[ f and u2:b ^ w[ f. System Z gives: D0 = {u1}, D1 = {u2}. The speciﬁcity
levels associated to the rules of D0 and D1 are 1/3 and 2/3, respectively. Let Dp be the possibilistic knowledge
base associated to D: {(b! f, 1/3), (b ^ w! f, 2/3)}. Let FC = {(b ^ w, 1)}, meaning that we are considering
a wounded bird. Then Inc(Dp [ FC) = 1/3 since Dp [ FC ‘ p(f, 1/3) from rule u1, we have also Dp [ FC
‘ p(f, 2/3) from rule u2, hence Dp [ FC ‘ p(?, 1/3) (applying the resolution rule of possibilistic logic, where
‘ p denotes the possibilistic entailment, see Appendix A). So, the ﬁnal base D only contains the formula
(b ^ w! f). So FC [ Dp ‘ p(f, 2/3). One concludes that a wounded bird is unable to ﬂy.
However, this method suﬀers from the ‘‘drowning eﬀect’’. For instance, if we had the rule ‘‘birds generally
have legs (l)’’, then it will not be possible to conclude that ‘‘wounded birds generally have legs’’, since the rule
b[ l will have 1/3 as speciﬁcity level.
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Our second approach is based on an idea presented in [12] and aims to remedy to the ‘‘drowning eﬀect’’
problem. In this work, the authors studied under which conditions they can infer b from a ^ c, given a rule
‘‘generally, a’s are b’s’’. Classical logic always answers that a ^ c infers b (monotony property). Default rea-
soning should answer like classical logic except when the c’s are exceptions of the rule. Hence, it is important
to check if a ^ c is an exception of the rule ‘‘generally, a’s are b’s’’.
Benferhat and Dupin de Saint-Cyr [12] used System P in order to answer this latter question since System P
never draws undesirable conclusions. In the following, the approach of [12] is extended by using ‘‘rational clo-
sure’’ inference relations instead of ‘‘preferential’’ inference relations. It is based on the identiﬁcation of rules
having exceptions in a given context (the approach is similar to Benferhat and Dupin de Saint-Cyr [12], but
uses rational closure instead of preferential closure).
Deﬁnition 3. Let FC be a propositional consistent factual base considered as the current context and fc 2L
be the associated proposition made of the conjunction of the formulas in FC. Let D be a set of default rules. A
default rule ai[ bi of D has an exception with fc if and only if one of the two following conditions is satisﬁed:
(1) ai ^ fc ^ bi is inconsistent, or (2) 9u 2L, s.t., fc ‘ u and ai ^ u R,Dbi, where R,D is the inference
relation deﬁned by the rational closure of the relation over the set obtained by interpreting each default
ai[ bi of D as ai bi.
For each rule ai[ bi of D, we can check if it is exceptional or not in the given context. If not, we change it
into a strict rule ai! bi, else we delete it.
Deﬁnition 4 (Contextual rational entailment). A formula w is said to be a CR-consequence (C for context and
R for rational) of D given a factual context fc, denoted by fc CR,Dw, if and only if w is a classical consequence
of Rfc[{fc}, where Rfc{ai! bijai[ bi 2 D has no exception with fc}:fc
CR;D
w iff Rfc [ ffcg ‘ w:Using the same reasoning as in [12], we can argue that CR,D is non-monotonic, since increasing the context
reduces the set of rules that have no exception, and thus the set of conclusions.
Proposition 1. If fc ‘ fc 0 then Rfc  Rfc0 .
Proof. Indeed, if 9ai ! bi 62 Rfc0 then (1) either {ai ^ fc 0 ^ bi is inconsistent since fc ‘ fc 0 then {ai ^ fc ^ bi is
also inconsistent, or (2) $u s.t. fc 0 ‘ u (hence fc ‘ u) and ai ^ u R,D bi. Hence, ai! bi 62 Rfc. h
We show now that CR,D is ‘‘rational’’, so, the conclusions obtained by the ﬁrst method can be obtained by
contextual rational entailment as well.
Proposition 2. "D, R,D  CR,D.
Proof. Indeed, if a rule ai[ bi has exceptions in a given context fc, then it means that ai ^ fc R,Dbi. So this
rule has a speciﬁcity level smaller or equal to the level of inconsistency of Dp [ {fc} (where Dp is the possibi-
listic knowledge base associated to D, Dp = {(ai! bi, d(ai[ bi))jai[ bi 2 D}). Hence, a rule having exception
in a given context cannot be used by R,D. Since we translate every default rule that has no exception into a
material implication, and use classical entailment on the set obtained, we use at least all rules that are kept by
R,D. So, this system can at least draw every conclusion obtained by R,D. h
Proposition 3. CR,D verifies Reflexivity, Left logical equivalence, Right weakening, Or, Cautious monotony,
Cut and Rational monotony.
See Appendix C, for the proof. Moreover, contextual rational entailment can obtain more conclusions than
rational entailment, namely it does not suﬀer from the drowning eﬀect:
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Rb^w = {b ^ w! f, b! l}, so b ^ w CR,Dl.
Note that some scholars (e.g. [16]) have pointed that ‘‘rational closure’’ may lead to deduce undesirable
results in examples where no conclusion is better than a conclusion that is too bold:
Example 3. Let D be a default base representing that ‘‘Quakers normally are paciﬁsts’’, ‘‘Quakers are generally
Americans’’, ‘‘Americans normally like base-ball’’, ‘‘Quakers generally do not like base-ball’’ and
‘‘Republicans are generally not paciﬁcists’’. D = {q[ p, q[ a, a[ b, q[ b, r[ p}. Then q ^ r CR,Dp ^
a ^ b, since Rq^r = {q! p, q! a, q! b}.
The result ‘‘paciﬁst’’ can be debatable (note that the two other conclusions are desirable). One can argue
that it would be better to not conclude anything about the plausibility of having p true or false. In our opinion,
it is not the fault of ‘‘rational closure’’ but, it is rather due to the ambiguity of the example. In this example,
there is only one piece of information about ‘‘Republicans’’. Indeed, here, ‘‘Republican’’ can be considered as
a general property, as general as ‘‘American’’. So its speciﬁcity level is as low as the American property. Mean-
while, if we learn that Republicans are Americans that have a given particularity (if they were only Americans,
then the two words would be synonymous) then the conclusions would change. Hence as discussed in [16], it is
not rational monotony that leads to undesirable conclusions, but it is rather a lack of information in the
knowledge base. A too adventurous conclusion is only caused by missing pieces of knowledge that the system
cannot guess on its own, and these pieces can be always added to the default base (without leading to incon-
sistency) in order to get the desirable conclusion (cf. [16]).
To conclude on this approach, it gives better results than the ﬁrst one, but the computation depends on the
context: a computation of the set of rules having no exception should be done before any new contextual
deduction.3.3. Method 3: rewriting the rules by expliciting their exceptions
The ﬁrst method handles default reasoning by deleting all the rules under a level of inconsistency in a given
context. It has the ‘‘drowning eﬀect’’ as a drawback: rules that are not directly involved in the inconsistency
may be deleted, while the second method correctly addresses this problem. However the computation in the
second method depends on the context: before each deduction a computation of the rules that are kept must
be done. Indeed, this computation may be heavy since the whole set of default rules D should be examined
with respect to any new context. Hence, we propose another method that somewhat handles these drawbacks.
The idea is to transform the default rules independently of any context into a set of non-defeasible rules. The
idea is to generate automatically from D a set of non-defeasible rules D in which the condition parts explicitly
state that we are not in an exceptional context to which other default rules refer. In the same time, strict rules
called ‘‘completion rules’’ stating that we are not in an exceptional situation are added to a new set CR. The
use of these completion rules is motivated by the need of reasoning in presence of incomplete information: the
completion allows us to still be able to apply the modiﬁed rules which now have a more precise condition part.
Note that the rules in CR will only be used if they are consistent with the context described in FC (taking D
into account). Hence, it only requires to do a consistency test each time the context FC is changed.
Deﬁnition 5 (Explicit rule and completion rule). Let D = {ai! bi}i=1 , . . . , k be a set of strict rules. For any given
default rule r = a[ b, we deﬁne the set of exceptions in D to the rule r by: E(a[ b,
D) = {aijai! bi 2 D,{ai ^ a} [ D0?,{bi ^ b} [ D ‘ ?}. The explicit rule associated with r is deﬁned by
a ^§ x2E(r, D) x! b. A completion rule associated with r is of the form a! x where x 2 E(r, D).
Rewriting algorithm
input
D ¼ fai,bigi¼1;...;k a set of default rules
D0; . . . ;Dn the stratification given by System Z ðDn is the most specific stratumÞ




output
D the set of all rules rewritten fromD
CR the set of completion rules:




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k ðrank of the current stratumÞ; Dk ðset of rules already rewritten from DkÞ;
r ðrule currently examinedÞ; Eðr;DÞ ðcurrent set of exceptions to r in the current DÞ:




begin
k :¼ n  1; CR :¼ ;; D :¼ {ani! bnijani[ bni 2 Dn}; {initialization}
while kP 0
do:
Dk :¼ ;;
for each rule r ¼ a,b 2 Dk do :
Eðr;DÞ :¼ ;;
for each rule a0 ! b0 2 D s:t:fa ^ a0g [ D0 ? and fb0 ^ bg [ D ‘?
do : Eðr;DÞ :¼ Eðr;DÞ [ fa0g;CR :¼ CR [ fa! :a0g;
Dk :¼ Dk [ fa ^
V
x2Eðr;DÞ:x! bg








D :¼ D [ Dk;
k :¼ k  1; fexamine the previous stratumg















end
Note that the rules of the last stratum n do not admit exceptions with respect to the knowledge base D since
they are the most speciﬁc ones. This is why they are directly transformed into strict classical rules. Then the
algorithm begins with the rules of the stratum n  1. The stratum n  1 contains rules that admit exceptions
only because of rules in the last stratum. More generally, a stratum k contains rules that admit exceptions only
because of rules in strata with rank greater or equal to k + 1. More precisely for each rule in a given stratum,
all its exceptions (coming from strata with a greater rank) are computed in order to rewrite this rule by explic-
itly stating that the exceptional situations are excluded in its condition part. Moreover, completion rules are
added for each exceptional case found; as already said, completion rules are useful to state in what respect the
current context is not exceptional. For instance, if b is the only exception to the rule a[ c, then the rule is
modiﬁed into a ^ b! c, and the completion rule, associated with it, has the form a! b. This completion
rule will only be used if it is consistent with the current context and the set of rewritten strict rules.
Proposition 4. This algorithm terminates.
Proof. The algorithm examines each rule of each stratum. For a rule of a stratum Dk, the algorithm executes
at most two consistency tests with each rule of strata of rank greater or equal to k + 1. Since each stratum is
ﬁnite, the algorithm terminates. h
Proposition 5. The set D of strict rules given by this algorithm is consistent.
Proof. At the beginning D is consistent since it is built on the set Dn of rules tolerated by the set
Dn(D0 [    [ Dn1) = Dn. It means that it exists x0an1 ^ bn1 where an1[ bn1 is the ﬁrst rule of Dn and sat-
isfying every other rules of Dn. Hence x0an1 ^ bn1 ^ {(ani _ bni)jani[ bni 2 Dn}.
At each step, a rule is added to D only if its conclusion is consistent with every conclusion of a rule of D.
For a rule r = a[ b from a stratum Dk, if it exists a rule a 0 ! b 0 in D such that b 0 ^ b ^ D ‘ ?, then r is
replaced by a ^ a 0 [ b. Note that a ^ a 0 is consistent since, by construction, every rule of Dk+1 is tolerated
by r, it means that it exists xa ^ b ^ D ^ (a 0 _ b 0), i.e, xa ^ a 0 ^ b. r modiﬁed by specifying all its
exceptions is added to D only when there is no more rule in Dk+1 whose conclusion is inconsistent with b. So D
remains consistent. h
Note that each rule of the initial default knowledge base is present, modiﬁed or not, in the resulting rule
base. So, there is no loss of information as with the previous method. Moreover the addition of rules
a[ a 0 and a ^ a 0 [ b in situations such that a[ b and a ^ a 0[  b hold, is in full agreement with pos-
tulates of rational closure [14]. Indeed, from a ^ c b, we have by consistency, a ^ c b. Then from a b and
a ^ c b, we get a c applying one of the equivalent forms of rational monotony. Moreover from this result
and a b we obtain a ^ c b by cautious monotony.
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given a factual context FC, denoted by FC RW,Dw, if and only if for any CR 0  CR, such that CR 0 is
maximally consistent with FC [ D, FC [ D [ CR 0 ‘ w where D and CR are, respectively, the set of strict rules
and the set of completion rules obtained from the rewriting algorithm.
Proposition 6. "D, R,D  RW,D.
Proof. As previously noticed, the addition of rules a ^ a 0 [ b in situations such that a[ b and a ^ a 0 [ b
hold, is in full agreement with postulates of rational closure. Moreover the consistency of D computed from D
(Proposition 5) allows us to transform[ into!. More formally, it gives: R,DD. The same reasoning can be
done for the completion rules: a[ a 0. It leads to R,DCR. Hence, R,D D [ CR, by right weakening, we get
R,D D [ CR 0 where CR 0  CR. So, if FC R,Dw then, by cautious monotony, FC [ D [ CR 0 R,Dw, i.e.,
FC RW,Dw. h
Proposition 7. RW,D verifies Reflexivity, Left logical equivalence, Right weakening, Or, Cautious monotony,
Cut and Rational monotony.
See Appendix C for the proof.
Example 4. Now we can rewrite the rules of Example 2 by describing explicitly their exceptions starting from
the last stratum. It gives the following knowledge base D = {b ^ w! f, b ^ w! f, b! l}. There is only
one completion rule: CR = {b! w}, hence, in the context FC = {b}, the completion rule is consistent, so it
allows us to deduce f ^ l. In the context FC = {b ^ w} we cannot add the completion rule since it is
inconsistent with FC so we can conclude f ^ l.
For ‘‘Nixon Diamond’’ example (see Example 3), the algorithm gives D = {q! p, q! a, q! b, a ^
q! b, r ^ q! p} and CR = {a! q, r! q}. In the context, q ^ r we deduce p, a and b. An intuitive
interpretation of the fact that paciﬁst is obtained is that the context Quaker is more speciﬁc than Republican in
this knowledge base, since Republican is compatible with all the rules which is not the case for Quaker.
It is now interesting to check if method 3 retrieves all the conclusions of method 2. We can establish that it
is the case.
Proposition 8. "D, CR,D  RW,D.
The last part of the proof (presented in Appendix C) has also pointed out that method 3, which is based on
the rewriting of the default rules, is only protected against existing exceptions that can be discovered by com-
piling the default base. In case the context FC corresponds to a new exception to which D does not refer,
method 3 cannot conclude anything meaningful (as it is the case of method 1), while method 2 would lead
to non-trivial conclusions by getting rid of rules inconsistent with FC. However, we may assume that the
default rule base refers to any exception that can be encountered in practice. Otherwise, it would mean that
there is some important missing information in D.4. Handling uncertain default rules
Let UD be a set of uncertain default rules of the form (a[ b, a), while D continues to represent a set of
default rules without certainty levels. In this paper, two types of levels are involved: namely levels encoding
speciﬁcity and levels of certainty. Although in the ﬁrst approach speciﬁcity levels are handled by possibilistic
logic in the same manner as the certainty levels will be processed in this section, the two types of levels should
not be confused and the inference process uses the two scales separately. In fact in each of the three above
methods for handling default rules, speciﬁcity is used to determine which rules are appropriate in the current
context. We denote by D the set of strict rules obtained from D by applying one of the three rewriting methods,
and we denote by UD the corresponding set of strict rules associated with their certainty levels. Then, in the
resulting base UD, the certainty levels should be taken into account in agreement with possibility theory in
order to draw plausible conclusions with their certainty levels.
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basis of its speciﬁcity level is selected or not with respect to the current context. If the rule is selected, it is then
rewritten into the form (a! b, a).
Using the second method, an uncertain default rule (a[ b, a) is also considered under the form (a[ b). If
it is not exceptional in the given context according to rational closure then it is changed into a strict rule as in
the previous method. Otherwise it is deleted. If the rule is selected, it is then rewritten into the form (a! b, a).
For the third method, an uncertain default rule (a[ b, a) is considered under the form (a[ b) and on the
basis of its speciﬁcity, its set of exceptions is computed, say a01, . . ., a
0
k. Then this rule is rewritten into the form
ða ^ :a01 ^ . . . ^ :a0k ! b; cÞ. Moreover, k completion rules are created and added to the set of completion rules
CR, namely, ða! :a01; d1Þ; . . . ða! :a0k; dkÞ. Remind that each rule in CR is used only if it is consistent with the
context and the set of rewritten rules. We have now to discuss how to determine the levels c, d1, . . . , dk.
The third method can be justiﬁed in the following way. On the one hand, as already said, the addition of
rules a,:a0i and a ^ :a0i,b in situations such that a[ b and a ^ a0i,:b hold, is in full agreement with pos-
tulates of rational closure [14]. Moreover, we have to assess the certainty levels c and d1, . . ., dk associated with
the added default rules. This can be done easily by interpreting the certainty levels of the default rules we start
with, as lower bounds of conditional necessity, namely N(bja) > a and Nð:bja ^ a0iÞ > bi, and noticing2 that
when the bounds are strictly positive, they coincide with the necessity of the corresponding material implica-
tion. Then from N(a _ b) > a and Nð:a _ :a0i _ :bÞ > bi, applying possibilistic resolution rule (see Appendix
A), we get Nð:a _ :a0iÞ > minða; biÞ. Then we can take di = min(a, bi). Moreover, the rule a ^ :a0i ! b is at
least as certain as a! b by monotonicity of necessity measure (see Appendix A), so we can take c = a.
Example 5. If we consider the following uncertain default base UD, describing the fact that birds generally ﬂy
with certainty a1, wounded birds generally do not ﬂy with certainty a2, and birds generally have legs with
certainty a3: {(b[ f, a1), (b ^ w[ f, a2), (b[ l, a3)}.
Then the possibilistic knowledge base Dp associated with UD by the ﬁrst method is the following (at this
step, the ignored certainty levels are kept between parentheses): {(b! f, 1/3(a1)), (b ^ w! f, 2/3 (a2)),
(b! l, 1/3 (a3))}.
Let FC = {(b ^ w, 1)}, meaning that we are considering a wounded bird. As previously computed,
Inc(Dp [ FC) = 1/3. Hence the ﬁnal uncertain base UD contains only the uncertain formula (b ^ w! f, a2).
So UD [ FC ‘p (f, a2). It means that it is certain at level a2 that a wounded bird is unable to ﬂy, but we
cannot conclude anything about its legs.
The second method rejects the rule b! f, since it admits exceptions in the given context b ^ w, leading to
the resulting base: {(b ^ w! f, a2), (b! l, a3)}. It means that it is certain at level a2 that a wounded bird is
unable to ﬂy, and at a3 that it has legs.
The third method gives the following knowledge base D: {(b ^ w! f, a2), (b ^ w! f, a1), (b! l, a3)},
together with the uncertain completion rule base {(b! w, min(a1, a2))}, hence, in the context FC = {(b, 1)},
the completion rule is consistent with FC and D, so it allows us to deduce f with certainty min(a1, a2) and l
with certainty a3. However, the use of methods 1 or 2 would have permitted to get a better lower bound of the
necessity measure of f, namely a1. This poorer lower bound is the price paid for the computational simplicity
of method 3 (compared to method 2). In the context FC = {(b ^ w, 1) we cannot add the completion rule since
it is inconsistent with FC so we can conclude f with certainty a2 and l with a3.
Note that the possibilistic setting also allows us to process uncertain factual contexts, namely formulas in
FC may have certainty levels less than 1.
5. Application to persistence modeling
The ability of handling uncertain default rules is useful for representing dynamical systems. Indeed, default
reasoning can help solving the ‘‘frame’’ and ‘‘qualiﬁcation’’ problems. The ‘‘frame problem’’ pertains to the2 P(bja) is deﬁned as the largest solution of the equation P(a ^ b) = min(P(bja), P(a)) applying the minimal speciﬁcity principle, which
favors the greatest possibility degrees that are in agreement with the constraints. It yields: P(bja) = 1 if P(a ^ b) >P(a ^ b) and
P(bja) = P(a ^ b) otherwise. Then N(bja) = 1  P(ajb) = 0 if N(a! b) > N(a! b) and N(bja) = N(a! b) otherwise.
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refers to the diﬃculty to exactly deﬁne all the preconditions of an action. An idea common to many proposals
for solving the frame problem is to use default comportment descriptions for expressing persistence. Stating
default transitions may be also useful for coping with the qualiﬁcation problem. Besides, the available knowl-
edge about the way a real system under study can evolve may be incomplete. This is why uncertainty should
also be represented, at least in a qualitative way.
In this section, the variables set V, on which the representation language L is built, may contain occur-
rences of action. More formally, letA be the set of action symbols. We consider that the variables setV con-
tains in addition to the symbols representing facts all the symbols do(a) where a 2A, representing action
occurrences. When there is ambiguity, variables may be indexed by a number representing the time point
in which it is considered. We denote by ft the formula f in which all variables are indexed by time point t.
The evolution of the world is described by uncertain default rules of the form (at[ bt+k, a) with kP 1, mean-
ing that if a is true at time t then b is generally true at time t + k with a certainty level of a.
In order to handle the frame problem, we choose to deﬁne a frame axiom. Among all the kinds of ﬂuents,
we can distinguish persistent ﬂuents (for which a change of value is surprising), from non-persistent ones
(which are also called dynamic [17]). Here, we assume that a set of non-persistent literals NP is deﬁned. Note
that occurrences of actions are clearly non-persistent ﬂuents: fdoðaÞja 2Ag  NP .
Deﬁnition 7 (Frame axiom). 8f 2V, if f 62 NP then (ft[ ft+1, p(f)) and if f 62 NP then (ft[ ft+1, p(f))
where p(f) is the persistence degree of f.
The persistence degree depends on the nature of the ﬂuent, for instance, the ﬂuent asleep is persistent but it is
less persistent than deaf.
Given the description of an evolving system composed of a set of uncertain default transition rules D
describing its behavior (D contains pure dynamic laws and default persistence rules (coming from the frame
axiom)) and a possibilistic knowledge base FCt that describes the initial state of the world, we can study
the problem of predicting the next state FCt+1 of the world. The following example inspired from [18] shows
how to describe a coﬀee machine behavior with uncertain default transition rules.
Example 6. Let us consider a coﬀee machine that may be working (w), have enough money in it (m), have a
goblet under the tap (g). Its normal behavior is roughly described byu1 : mt,gtþ1 ^ :mtþ1 0:9 u2 : mt ^ :wt,:gtþ1 0:9
where u1 means that if the machine has money in it then in the next step a goblet is under the tap and the money
is spent. This ﬁrst rule describes the intended coﬀee machine behavior supposing that it is working correctly.
But it admits an exception described by u2. The agent is able to perform only one action on this machine: ‘‘give
money’’ (gm). This action has an uncertain eﬀect since giving money may fail if the coin is faked money (f).u3 : doðgmÞt,mtþ1 0:8 u4 : doðgmÞt ^ ft,:mtþ1 0:7
We consider m as the only non-persistent ﬂuent (as soon as m is true, it becomes false because of the rule u1):
NP = {m}. Hence, persistence is encoded as follows (for the simplicity of the example, we have put the same
level of persistence for all rules, but it is not compulsory):u5 : gt,gtþ1 0:9 u6 : wt,wtþ1 0:9 u7 : ft,ftþ1 0:9
u8 : :mt,:mtþ1 0:9 u9 : :gt,:gtþ1 0:9 u10 : :wt,:wtþ1 0:9
u11 : :ft,:ftþ1 0:9In the initial state the agent is not absolutely sure that the coﬀee machine is working but he puts money in it
(he thinks it is not faked money). FCt = {(do(gm)0, 1), (m0, 1), (g0, 1), (f0, 0.9)}, there is no money, no
goblet, and it is almost certain that the money is not faked.
From a set of uncertain default transition rules of the form (at[ bt+1, a), we can apply the methods presented
in the previous section in order to obtain a setD of uncertain transition rules of the form (at! bt+1, a). FromD
and a knowledge base FCt describing the initial state, the next state can be computed syntactically as follows:
FCt+1 = {(bt+1, a)j$(at, c) s.t. (at! bt+1, b) 2 D and FCt ‘ p(at, c) and a = min(b, c)}
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respond to all the possible states of knowledge about the initial state of the system [18]:D0 ¼ fð_Ið^JaiÞ ! _Ið^J biÞ;min
i2I[J
aiÞj8ðai ! bi; aiÞ 2 Dgwhere I and J are any independent sets of indices of rules in D.
Example 7. System Z gives three strata for Example 6: D0 = {u1, u5, . . . , u11}, D1 = {u2, u3} and D2 = {u4}.
Applying the ﬁrst method leads to compute Inc(FC0 [ Dp) where Dp is the possibilistic knowledge base
associated with D. Then delete all the rules of Dp that have a smaller speciﬁcity level. Only three rules are kept:
u2:(mt ^ wt! gt+1, 0.9), u3: (do(gm)t! mt+1, 0.8) and u4:(do(gm)t ^ ft! mt+1, 0.7). Hence, we can
deduce (m1, 0.8) meaning that the machine has money in it in the next state.
The above example shows a drawback of the ﬁrst method: all the persistence rules are drowned. Hence we
are not able to determine the value of the ﬂuents that are not concerned by transitions. The third method has
not this drawback and preserves the following larger rule base where the modiﬁed parts of rules are in bold:
Example 8. u4: (do(gm)t ^ ft! mt+1, 0.7); u2: (mt ^ wt! gt+1, 0.9); u3: (do(gm)t ^ ft ! mt+1, 0.8); u1:
(mt ^ wt ^ (do(gm)t ^ ft)! gt+1 ^ mt+1, 0.9); u5:(gt ^ (mt ^ wt)! gt+1, 0.9); u6: (wt! wt+1, 0.9); u7:
(ft! ft+1, 0.9); u8: (mt ^ (do(gm)t ^ ft)!  mt+1, 0.9); u9:(gt! gt+1, 0.9); u10: (wt! wt+1, 0.9);
u11: (ft! ft+1, 0.9).
Note that exceptions to persistence laws correspond to occurrences of actions, as expected. If the initial
knowledge base FC0 is now {(do(gm)0, 1), (m0, 1), (g0, 1)}, completion rules are: {(do(gm)t! ft,
min(0.8, 0.7) = 0.7), (mt! wt, 0.9), (mt! (do(gm)t ^ ft), 0.8), (gt! (mt ^ wt), 0.9)}. So at time point
t + 1, FCt+1 contains (mt+1, 0.7), (gt+1, 0.9), (ft+1, 0.9), meaning that there is money (with a certainty
degree of 0.7) in the machine, no goblet and the coin is not faked (with a certainty degree of 0.9).
One noticeable advantage of the third method is that the deduction can be iterated without recompilation
of the default base (whereas it would be necessary with the second method).
6. Related works
The two non-monotonic inference relations ‘‘Contextual rational entailment’’ and ‘‘Rewriting entailment’’,
that we have proposed in this paper, and used in method 2 and method 3, respectively, are new. They are both
‘‘rational closure’’ entailments, and allow us to deduce more conclusions than ‘‘System Z’’ [4] entailment (or
its equivalent ‘‘best-out’’ entailment [19]). There has been other proposals for ‘‘rational closure’’ inference
from defaults, among them, the ‘‘lexicographic entailment’’ [19,20] is an approach that is recognized to give
good results, in particular, as our two approaches, it avoids ‘‘blocking of inheritance problems’’. Meanwhile it
has a drawback, it is sensitive to direct or indirect redundancy since it is based on a counting of the rules, while
our two methods are not.
Example 9 (Variations on Nixon example). Direct redundancy: {q[ p, q[ p, r[  p}, what can be said
about q ^ r?
Indirect redundancy: {q[ p, r[ p, e[ p} where the last rule means that ‘‘ecologists are generally
paciﬁsts’’. What can be said about q ^ r ^ e?
Lexicographic entailment allows us to conclude paciﬁst in the two redundancy cases, meanwhile in these
two cases ‘‘rational contextual entailment’’ concludes to an inconsistency and ‘‘rewriting entailment’’ cannot
conclude neither to paciﬁst nor to not paciﬁst. This ambiguity preservation seems to be a desirable conclusion
in such an example.
There has been very few works handling both defeasibility and uncertainty, up to the noticeable exception
of system Z+[1] that handles default rules having strengths modeled in the setting of Spohn ordinal condition
functions [21], and their exploitation by maximum entropy principle, taking advantage of the probabilistic
interpretation of Spohn functions [22]. In system Z+, a default rule (a[ b) is extended with a parameter
representing the degree of strength or ﬁrmness of the rule and denoted by (a! db). This is interpreted as a
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pretations with an integer value that expresses impossibility (thus 0 means full possibility and 1 means full
impossibility). Translated in possibilistic terms, it amounts to deal with constraints of the form P(a ^ b) >
k · P(a ^ b) with kP 1, using the standard transformation between kappa functions and possibility mea-
sures [23]. Thus, the k’s are like uncertainty odds. In Z+, the ranking of defaults is obtained by comparing
sums of strength degrees, somewhat mixing the ideas of speciﬁcity and strength. Separate scales for speciﬁcity
and certainty are not used is this approach, so certainty levels are introduced in the computation of the levels
reﬂecting speciﬁcity ordering. This leads to an interaction between the two notions. For instance, encoding our
Example 1 in a Z+ formalism, we get: r1 : b!d1f and r2 : b ^ w!d2:f , where d1 and d2 are non-negative inte-
gers. System Z+ generates the following ranking on the two interpretations {b, w, f} and {b, w, f}:
j({b, w, f}) = Z+(r2) = d1 + d2 + 1 and j({b, w, f}) = Z+(r1) = d1. Thus in Z+, the strengths of the defaults
are combined for determining their respective speciﬁcity level, and paradoxically, not really for computing the
certainty levels of the conclusions. The approach presented here distinguishes more carefully between speciﬁc-
ity and certainty.
As shown on the following example, the way system Z+ handles defeasibility and certainty in a mixed way
may not always yield the expected conclusion.
Example 10. Consider the following default base stating that birds generally ﬂy, birds generally are not
palmate, wounded birds generally do not ﬂy, and that duck birds generally are palmate.
fb!d1f ; b!d2:p; b ^ w!d3:f ; b ^ d!d4pg.
System Z+ associates to these defaults the following respective ranks d1, d2, d1 + d3 + 1, d2 + d4 + 1.
Assume that the values of the di’s are such that d1 < d1 + d3 + 1 < d2 < d2 + d4 + 1 (which does not correspond
to a reﬁnement of the Z ordering!). Then, from a wounded duck bird, System Z+ concludes that it is palmate
but cannot conclude that it cannot ﬂy as System Z will do.
Another interesting approach handling both defeasibility and uncertainty has been proposed in [2] in a set-
ting where probabilistic logic is combined with default reasoning. Lukasiewicz proposes a framework that can
handle simultaneously strict propositional rules, probabilistic formulas and default formulas. A basic diﬀer-
ence with our proposal is that default formulas are classical default rules, meanwhile in this paper a new kind
of default rules that are also pervaded with uncertainty is considered. Recently, Lukasiewicz and Schellhase
[24] have proposed a setting for representing variable strength conditional preferences where a default contex-
tual preference is stated together with a strength, in the spirit of system Z+. Our setting could be also used in
that perspective keeping the handling of the default nature of preferences separate from the processing of the
strengths.
Nicolas et al. [3,25] also present an approach that deals with defeasibility and uncertainty in a possibilistic
framework. But, they combine possibilistic logic with Answer Set Programming rather than using the same
setting for default and uncertainty handling. Certainty levels are used in order to help to restore consistency
of a logic program by removing rules that are below a level of inconsistency. As our ﬁrst method, this
approach does not avoid the drowning problem, while our two other methods do.
Using an uncertain framework in order to describe an evolving system has been done by many authors, for
instance in a probabilistic setting. But reasoning in this setting implies to dispose of many a priori probabil-
ities, this is why using defeasibility may help to reduce the size of information for representing the system.
Besides, it is a common idea to deﬁne a frame axiom in terms of default rules (see [26] for an overview).
But, as far as we know, frame rules are either considered as default rules (see [27,28] for instance), or are asso-
ciated with low priority levels (see [29]), but do not involve both default and uncertainty feature.
7. Conclusion
We have proposed a representation framework that allows us to handle rules which are both uncertain and
defeasible. Three inference methods have been presented, which have two steps: ﬁrst building a set of non-
defeasible rules that can be used in the current context, and then processing the uncertainty of the identiﬁed
rules in the setting of possibility theory. Two of these methods avoid the blocking of inheritance eﬀect. In the
‘‘rewriting entailment’’ method, only a small part of the set of rules (namely, the ‘‘completion’’ rules stating by
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method proposed, namely the ‘‘contextual rational entailment’’, in which all the rules must be reexamined
when the context changes. Besides, the ‘‘rewriting entailment’’ where defaults are rewritten by mentioning
explicit exceptions is reminiscent of techniques used in circumscription-based approaches. Moreover, it could
be interesting to study how to cast the ‘‘rewriting entailment’’ into a logic programming setting to solve the
drowning problem encountered in [25].
We have suggested that uncertain default rules may be of interest in the context of dynamic systems for
handling the ‘‘frame’’ and the ‘‘qualiﬁcation’’ problems, thanks to default transition rules. The approach
allows us to introduce diﬀerent levels of persistence. It would be even possible to deal with decreasing persis-
tence (i.e., the value of the persistence level depends on the time spent). This could be processed by using fuzzy
default rules, encoded in a possibilistic manner as in [8] (where the level of uncertainty is a membership degree
whose value depends on the instantiation of variable(s) appearing in the ﬁrst order logic part of possibilistic
formulas).
Besides, the use of the approach for handling fuzzy default rules may also ﬁnd applications for handling
default inheritance in fuzzy description logic in a possibilistic logic setting [30].Appendix A. Background on possibility theory
Possibility theory [10] associates to a formula f two measures, namely its possibility P(f) which measures
how unsurprising the formula f is (P(f) = 0 means that f is bound to be false) and its dual necessity
N(f) = 1  P(f) (N(f) = 1 means that f is bound to be true). Necessity obeys to the characteristic axiom
N(f ^ g) = min(N(f), N(g)). A possibilistic knowledge base is a set K = {(ui, ai),i = 1, . . . , n}, where ui is a
propositional formula of L and its certainty level (or weight) ai is such that N(ui)P ai, N being a necessity
measure.
The resolution rule [31] is valid in possibilistic logic: (a _ b, a); (a _ c, b) ‘ (b _ c, min(a, b)), where ‘
denotes the syntactic inference of possibilistic logic. Classical resolution is retrieved when all weights are equal
to 1. The resolution rule allows us to compute the maximal certainty level that can be attached to a formula
according to the constraints expressed by the base K. This can be done by adding to K the clauses obtained by
refuting the proposition to evaluate, with a necessity level equal to 1. Then it can be shown that any lower
bound obtained on ?, by resolution, is a lower bound of the necessity of the proposition to evaluate. Let
Inc(K) = max{ajKa ‘ ?} with Ka = {fj(f, b) 2 K and bP a}, with the convention max(;) = 0. In case of par-
tial inconsistency of K (Inc(K) > 0), a refutation carried out in a situation where Inc(K[{(f, 1)}) = a > Inc(K)
yields the non-trivial conclusion (f, a), only using formulas whose certainty levels are strictly greater than the
inconsistency level of the base. This is the syntactic possibilistic entailment, noted ‘ p.Appendix B. Background on default rules
A default rule is an expression a[ b where a and b are propositional formulas ofL and[ is a new sym-
bol. a[ b translates, in the possibility theory framework, into the constraint P(a ^ b) > P(a ^ b) which
expresses that having b true is strictly more possible than having it false when a is true [32]. The use of default
rules has two main interests. First, it simpliﬁes the writing: it allows us to express a rule without mentioning
every exceptions to it. Second, it allows us to reason with incomplete descriptions of the world: if nothing is
known about the exceptional character of the situation, it is assumed to be normal, and reasoning can be com-
pleted. Several authors [13,33] have developed an approach for handling reasoning with default rules based on
postulates stating the characteristic properties of a non-monotonic consequence relations. In this setting, two
inferences are deﬁned: a cautious one named ‘‘preferential’’ and a more adventurous one named ‘‘rational clo-
sure inference’’.
Pearl [4] provides an algorithm which gives a stratiﬁcation of a set of default rules in a way that reﬂects the
speciﬁcity of the rules. Roughly speaking, the ﬁrst stratum contains the most speciﬁc rules, i.e., which do not
admit exceptions (at least, expressed in the considered default base), the second stratum has exceptions only in
the ﬁrst stratum and so on.
80 F. Dupin de Saint-Cyr, H. Prade / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 49 (2008) 67–82Deﬁnition 8 (System Z stratification). A default rule a[ b is tolerated by a set of default rules D if it exists an
interpretation x such that x  a ^ b and "ai[ bi 2 D, x  ai _ bi. This deﬁnition allows us to stratify D into
(D0, D1, . . . , Dn) such that D0 contains the set of rules of D tolerated by D, D1 contains the set of rules of DnD0
tolerated by DnD0 and so on. The number Z(r) corresponds to the rank of the stratum in which the rule r is.
It has been shown [32] that each default rule r = a[ b of a default base D, can be associated with a pos-
sibilistic formula (a! b, r), where r represents its speciﬁcity level r ¼ ZðrÞþ1nþ2 , n being the index of the last stra-
tum in the system Z stratiﬁcation of D. Applying possibilistic inference to the possibilistic base associated with
a default base in this sense is equivalent to compute the rational closure inference [13,33] of the original default
base [32].Appendix C
Proofs of Propositions 3, 7 and 8
Proof (Of Proposition 3). Reflexivity: Since R,D is a rational entailment relation, a R,Da, hence using
Proposition 2, a RC,Da.
Left logical equivalence: if ‘ aM b then using Proposition 1 with a ‘ b and b ‘ a, we get Ra = Rb. So, if
‘ aM b and a RC,Dc (i.e., Ra[{a} ‘ c) then Rb[{b} ‘ c (i.e., b RC,Dc).
Right weakening: c RC,Da means Rc [ {c} ‘ a, hence, if a ‘ b then Rc [ {c} ‘ b, i.e., c RC,Db.
Cut: Using Proposition 1 with a ^ b ‘ a, we get Ra^b  Ra, hence Ra ‘ Ra^b. If a RC,Db (i.e., Ra [ {a} ‘ b)
then Ra [ {a} ‘ Ra^b [ {a ^ b}, so if a ^ b RC,Dc (i.e., Ra ^ b [ {a ^ b} ‘ c) then a RC,Dc.
Cautious monotony: Let us suppose that Ra [ {a} ‘ b (H1) and that Ra [ {a} ‘ c (H2). Let us consider a
formula ai! bi 2 Ra. If it does not belong to Ra^b then it means that
(1) either ai ^ a ^ b ^ bi is inconsistent, but due to (H1) it entails that Ra [ {a} ‘ ai, then it means that
ai! bi is not used to prove c in (H2),
(2) or ai ^ a ^ b R,Dbi, then using Proposition 2, we get Rai^a^b [ fai ^ a ^ bg ‘ :bi, using Proposition 1
with ai ^ a ^ b ‘ a, we get Rai^a^b  Ra hence Ra [ {ai ^ a ^ b} ‘ bi. Moreover, (H1) entails that
Ra [ {a ^ ai} ‘ b, it entails that Ra[{a ^ ai} ‘ bi. Since ai! bi 2 Ra, it means that Ra[{a ^ ai} is incon-
sistent which is impossible since we are in the case Ra [ {a} 0 ai.
Hence, any formula ai! bi such that Ra [ {a} 0 ai is in Ra^b. Now, since (H2) Ra [ {a} ‘ c then
Ran{ai! bi 2 Ra, Ra [ {a} ‘ ai} [ {a} ‘ c, it means that Ra^b [ {a} ‘ c hence, Ra ^ b [ {a ^ b} ‘ c.
Or: Using Proposition 1 with a ‘ a _ b, we get Ra  Ra _ b and Rb  Ra _ b, hence Ra_b ‘ Ra [ Rb. If
a RC,Dc (i.e., Ra [ {a} ‘ c) and b RC,Dc (i.e., Rb [ {b} ‘ c) then Ra _ b[{a _ b} ‘ Ra [ Rb [ {a _ b} ‘ c, hence
a _ b RC,Dc.
Rational monotony: We reason in a similar way as for Cautious monotony, we ﬁrst suppose that
Ra [ {a} ‘ b (H1) and that Ra [ {a} 0 c (H2). We consider a formula ai! bi 2 Ra. If it does not belong to
Ra^c then it means that either (1)ai ^ a ^ c ^ bi is inconsistent, but since (H1) it entails that Ra [ {a} ‘ ai, or
(2) ai ^ a ^ c R,Dbi, then using Proposition 2, we get Rai^a^c [ fai ^ a ^ cg ‘ :bi, using Proposition 1 with
ai ^ a ^ c ‘ a, we get Ra[{ai ^ a ^ c} ‘ bi. Since ai! bi 2 Ra, it means that Ra [ {a ^ c} ‘ ai. Hence, any
formula ai! bi such that Ra [ {a} 0  ai and Ra [ {a ^ c} 0 ai is in Ra^c. Now, since (H2) Ra[{a} ‘ b then
Ra [ {a ^ c} ‘ b and also Ra n({ai! bi 2 Ra, Ra [ {a} ‘ ai or Ra[{a ^ c} ‘ ai}) [ {a ^ c} ‘ c, it means that
Ra^c [ {a ^ c} ‘ b. h
Proof (Of Proposition 7). Reflexivity: by monotony of ‘, "CR 0  CR, {a} [ D [ CR 0 ‘ a.
Left logical equivalence: if ‘ aM b then any subset of CR maximal consistent with a is also maximal
consistent with b. Hence, if "CRa  CR, CRa maximal consistent with {a} [ D, {a} [ D [ CRa ‘ c then
"CRb  CR, CRb maximal consistent with {b} [ D, {a} [ D [ CRb ‘ c. Since ‘aM b, we get the result.
Right weakening: if a ‘ b and "CRc  CR, CRc maximal consistent with {c} [ D, {c} [ D [ CRc ‘ a then
by transitivity of ‘, {c} [ D [ CRc ‘ b.
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CRa^b [ D[{a ^ b} ‘ c (H1) and that "CRa, where CRa is a maximal subset of CR consistent with
{a} [ D, CRa [ D [ {a} ‘ b (H2). Note that (H2) means that if CRa is a maximal subset of CR consistent with
{a} [ D, then it is consistent with b. Hence it is a maximal subset of CR consistent with {a ^ b} [ D. Hence by
H1 we get that CRa [ D[{a ^ b} ‘ c. Moreover, (H2) implies that CRa [ D[{a} ‘ CRa [ D[{a ^ b}. Hence,
CRa [ D[{a} ‘ c.
Cautious monotony: Let us suppose that "CRa, where CRa is a maximal subset of CR consistent with
{a} [ D, CRa [ D[{a} ‘ b (H1) and CRa [ D[{a} ‘ c (H2). Suppose that it exists a subset of CR, CRa^b
maximal consistent with {a ^ b} [ D which is not maximal consistent with {a} [ D, it means that it exists a
subset consistent with {a} [ D that contains strictly CRa^b, let us consider the maximal subset consistent with
{a} [ D containing strictly CRa ^ b then using H1 it is consistent with b, which means that CRa ^ b could not
be maximal. So this supposition was absurd and we get that CRa ^ b should be maximal consistent with a [ D.
Hence using H2, we get "CRa ^ b, where CRa ^ b is a maximal subset of CR consistent with {a ^ b} [ D,
CRa ^ b [ D [ {a ^ b} ‘ c.
Or: Let us suppose that "CRa, where CRa is a maximal subset of CR consistent with {a} [ D,
CRa [ D[{a} ‘ c (H1) and that "CRb, where CRb is a maximal subset of CR consistent with
{b} [ D, CRb [ D[{b} ‘ c (H2). Suppose that it exists a subset of CR, CRa_b maximal consistent with
{a _ b} [ D which is consistent with {a _ b} [ D [ {c}. It means that it exists an interpretation x 2 X
satisfying CRa _ b [ {a _ b} [ D [ {c}. Either x  a, then CRa _ b is consistent with a, so it is a maximal
subset consistent with {a} [ D. Using H1, CRa_b [ D[{a} ‘ c, hence x can not satisfy c. Using a similar
reasoning, we get that x  b is also impossible. Hence the supposition was absurd, it means that for any subset
of CR, CRa _ b maximal consistent with {a _ b} [ D, CRa _ b [ {a _ b} [ D ‘ c.
Rational monotony: Let us show that if a RWb and a RWc then a ^ c RWb. By showing that if a RWb
and a ^ c RWb then a RW c. Let us suppose that "CRa, where CRa is a maximal subset of CR consistent
with {a} [ D, CRa [ D [ {a} ‘ b (H1) and that it exists CRa ^ c, where CRa ^ c is a maximal subset of CR
consistent with {a ^ c} [ D, such that CRa^c [ D [ {a ^ c}[{b} is consistent (H2). If it exists a subset of CR,
CRa which is maximal consistent with {a} [ D and such that CRa^c  CRa, it means that CRa is not consistent
with c (else CRa^c would not be maximal). It means that for all CRa maximal consistent with {a} [ D,
CRa [ {a} [ D ‘ c. If there is no such CRa (maximal consistent with {a} [ D and such that CRa ^ c  CRa), it
means that CRa ^ c is maximal consistent with a [ D, hence using H1, we get CRa ^ c [ D[{a} ‘ b which is in
contradiction with H2. Hence the second case never happens. h
Proof (Of Proposition 8). CR,D is based on the use of classical entailment from the set Rfc [ {fc} in a given
context fc, meanwhile RW,D uses classical entailment from the setD [ CR 0 whereD is the set of rewritten rules
from D and CR 0 is a maximal subset of completion rules that is consistent with FC [ D (see Deﬁnitions 4 and 6).
Hence, in order to compare the two entailments it is enough to compare the two sets Rfc and D [ CR 0.
Let us consider a given rule ai[ bi of the initial default base D. Let E(ai[ bi, D) be its set of exceptions inD.
• If {ai ^ bi} [ FC is consistent then– if {ai} [ FC R,Dbi then ai! bi will be present in Rfc. Moreover it
means that for any exception a 0 of the initial rule, FC[{ai} 0 a 0. Indeed assume that FC [ {ai} ‘ a 0 and
a 0 being an exception, we have {a 0 ^ ai} [ D ‘ bi. This would imply that FC[{ai} [ D ‘ bi, which is
in contradiction with our starting hypothesis. Hence, ﬁnally, FC [ {ai} is consistent with every completion
rule associated to ai[ bi, so also consistent with the rewritten condition part of this rule. Hence, the con-
clusion bi can also be drawn by method 3.– else {ai} [ FC R,Dbi so ai! bi 62 Rfc.
Note that it implies that $a 0 2 E(ai[ bi, D) such that FC[{ai} ‘ a 0 (by reasoning in a similar way as
above). Hence there is a completion rule, namely, ai! a 0, belonging to the set of completion rules asso-
ciated to ai[ bi that is not consistent with FC. Hence the initial rule ai[ bi whose condition part has been
rewritten, will not be ﬁred in method 3, in this case.
• Else {ai ^ bi} [ FC is inconsistent. In this case, for method 2, ai! bi will not be present in RFC. For method
3, there are two cases– either fVx2Eðai,bi ;DÞ:xg [ FC is inconsistent. It means that the explicit rule
ai ^
V
x2Eðai,bi ;DÞ:x ! bi could not be used, leading to the same result as in method 2.– or
V
x2Eðai,bi;DÞ:x
is consistent with FC. It means that the rule ai ^
V
x2Eðai,bi;DÞ:x ! bi is inconsistent with FC. Then the third
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set of possible conclusions. hReferences
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